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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the accounting and stock price performance of two Canadian airlines, 
WestJet and Air Canada, over a five year period, taking into account the aftermath of the 
systemic shock to the airline industry produced by the September 11, 2001 (9-11), terrorist 
attacks and subsequent events such as the 2002 SARS outbreak, the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and the accompanying rise in jet fuel prices. Our study focuses on the viability of 
low-cost versus conventional-cost business models in Canada under the current business 
environment and the ability of airlines to withstand and effectively respond to catastrophic 
industry events.  Furthermore, we link the effectiveness of the airlines’ responses to these 
events to specific elements of their respective business models. We test our hypothesis 
through a case study. We focus on WestJet as a typical low-cost airline and compare its 
accounting and stock performance to Air Canada, a legacy carrier and rival in several 
business sectors.  We find WestJet to be much less affected by catastrophic industry events. 
By decomposing each airline’s return volatility, we observe that WestJet’s systematic and 
unsystematic risk increased only slightly during the industry’s post-9-11 turmoil when 
compared to Air Canada. In addition, we find that both WestJet’s accounting and stock 
performance have been highly superior to those of Air Canada.  We argue that WestJet’s 
business model provides the firm with significantly more financial and operational 
flexibility than its legacy rival, Air Canada.  WestJet’s lower operating costs, high 
consumer trust, product offering, corporate structure, workforce and work practices, as 
well as operational procedures are all factors that appear to contribute to its relative 
success. 
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The extant aviation literature includes several studies that discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of the distinct business models employed by 
low-cost and full-service carriers.1  Earlier studies by Lawton (2002, 2003) 
discuss the strategies that both types of airlines have pursued in reaction to 
the September 11, 2001 (9-11) attacks and outline how those airlines have 
fared after 9-11. Although Lawton provides a brief review of the airlines’ 
stock performance, his discussion is mostly qualitative in nature.  Carter and 
Simkins (2004) provide a quantitative analysis of the stock performance of a 
sample of United States airlines to the events of 9-11, but do not focus on 
performance differences between low-cost versus full-service airlines. More 
recently, Flouris and Walker (2005a, 2005b) analyze performance 
differences between low-cost and full-service carriers in a risk-adjusted 
event study framework. All of these studies focus exclusively on the U.S. 
airline industry, however, and only consider the stock price performance of 
the sampled airlines. We add to the literature by providing the first 
comprehensive analysis of low-cost versus legacy carrier performance 
outside of the U.S. and by analyzing not only the stock price performance 
following such catastrophic events as 9-11 but also the impact of 9-11 and 
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1 In line with other authors, we also use the terms legacy, conventional-cost, 
traditional-cost or full-fare when referring to full-service carriers and LCC 
or low-fare when referring to low-cost carriers. 
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similar events on the accounting performance and risk profile, that is, the 
systematic and unsystematic return volatility, of the affected airlines.  Our 
results are very consistent and provide interesting insights into the Canadian 
airline industry and into the differences between the two business models 
used by Air Canada and WestJet.  In addition, our small sample size allows 
for a firm-by-firm discussion of special circumstances that affect each 
airline.  These firm-specific discussions reveal several important facts that 
are usually not addressed in large-sample studies.  As such, our approach is 
consistent with earlier studies by Bowen, Castanias, and Daley (1983), Hill 
and Schneeweis (1983), Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1992), and Lamb 
(1995) who employ small sample studies to investigate the impact of an 
event or a series of events on a firm’s performance and risk exposure. 
Given the existence of varied regulatory frameworks across countries, a 
comprehensive large sample analysis of the performance differences 
between two business models is likely to yield biased and inconsistent 
results. Thus, we follow the extant literature and employ a case study in 
which we focus on a set of two airlines which, aside from their business 
model, are largely comparable. As such, our study is part of a series of 
similar case studies employing small sample comparisons of airlines in one 
country at a time. 
Our methodological approach proceeds as follows. We first examine the 
short-term and long-term stock price performance as well as the accounting 
performance of WestJet and Air Canada during the post-9-11 period.2 We 
then analyze how 9-11 impacted the risk, that is, the systematic and 
unsystematic volatility of the airlines’ stock returns. We choose WestJet as a 
low-cost carrier representative and Air Canada as a firm that follows a full-
service business model. These two airlines are the only firms in the Canadian 
airline industry that are publicly traded. As such, our paper is a complete 
account of the Canadian airline industry in terms of the firms for which stock 
price and accounting data are available. 
When analyzing a firm’s accounting performance around a particular 
event we can gain valuable insights into how the event impacted the firm’s 
revenues, profitability, liquidity, as well as a variety of other performance 
measures.  Because such an analysis only employs historical data, however, 
                                                 
2 For brevity and expositional convenience we will hereafter refer to the pre-
9-11 and post-9-11 periods. It should be noted, however, that our study does 
not only consider the industry’s reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. Rather, the post-9-11 period also includes such critical events as 
the 2002 SARS outbreak, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 
accompanying rise in jet fuel prices. Thus, our study focuses not on a single 
event but on a series of events that have dramatically altered the industry 
landscape in recent years. 
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it provides little insight into the expected future performance of the firm. To 
examine the impact of a catastrophic industry event on the future prospects 
of our sample airlines we analyze their stock performance before and after 
the event. Because stock market participants base their valuation of a 
company’s stock on the firm’s expected future cash flows rather than on 
historical information, an event study of a firm’s stock price performance 
reflects how the market as a whole anticipates the firm to do in the future. 
Lawton (2003) advances the argument that low-cost carriers were in a 
position to go on the offensive and aggressively exploit the changed industry 
climate after 9-11 by renegotiating labor contracts, by negotiating lower 
prices for new airplanes in what had suddenly become a buyer’s market for 
new aircraft, and by pursuing aggressive pricing strategies to increase their 
market share relative to legacy carriers. Legacy carriers, being exposed to a 
significantly higher overhead burden, were forced into defensive strategies 
that provided them with little operational flexibility. These developments are 
difficult to observe in the airlines’ accounting figures in the short term but—
if they are perceived to change a firm’s future cash flows—should be 
reflected in the market’s valuation of the firm’s stock.  
When investigating the impact of catastrophic industry events on each 
airline’s risk, we consider both the systematic and unsystematic volatility of 
the stocks’ returns. This allows us to differentiate between risk factors that 
affected the market as a whole and risk factors that affected the firms 
specifically. 
Although we employ only a small sample, our results are highly 
consistent.3  We observe that WestJet performed significantly better after 9-
11 than its mainstream competitor in almost all aspects of accounting 
performance. During 2001, arguably one of the worst years in global 
aviation history, WestJet remained profitable.  Only three airlines in the U.S. 
(JetBlue, Southwest, and Air Tran4) and a handful globally were also 
profitable in 2001.  In 2002, WestJet continued to fare better than its full-
service competitor.  In addition, its stock held up significantly better than the 
                                                 
3 Note that with a bigger sample, one could perform a regression analysis of 
the airlines’ accounting performance and abnormal returns after 9-11 on a 
variety of firm characteristics. This would allow for a more exact 
measurement of how each aspect of a firm’s operations contributes to its 
success or failure. Unfortunately, such an analysis is not possible given that 
there are not enough low-cost and conventional-cost carriers in either the 
U.S. or Canada to form a broad enough sample that would allow for such an 
analysis. Thus, our analysis focuses on examining a small sample of airlines 
that have clearly different business models but are otherwise comparable 
with respect to size and pre-9-11 performance. 
4 These airlines also follow different variations of a low-cost business model. 
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stock of Air Canada and showed a significantly smaller increase in 
unsystematic risk after 9-11.  Our discussion elaborates on the qualitative 
aspects that sets these airlines apart and drives their performance differences. 
Our findings provide empirical support for the qualitative discussion in 
Lawton (2003). In addition, they help explain the success of WestJet.  We do 
not advocate that the low-cost model is uniform in the way it manifests in the 
market.  Our argument is that the low-cost model, in its generic 
manifestation, can be differentiated from the full-service model along three 
management dimensions. They include adopting a viable strategic position, 
leveraging organizational capabilities, and reconceiving the value equation. 
These dimensions, coupled with the unique operational features that low-cost 
airlines have (pricing structure, fleet composition, route structure, choice of 
airports, distribution, and productivity) help explain, theoretically, why low-
cost carriers are in the position to outperform their full-service rivals. 
Zorn (2001) argues that low-cost carriers are more resilient than legacy 
carriers in times of economic downturn.  Our analysis focusing on WestJet’s 
performance validates this point, and Zorn’s analysis helps us demonstrate it 
theoretically.  Zorn cites several reasons for the resilience of low-cost 
carriers in times of recession: first, a lower overall and more variable cost 
structure; second, a lower breakeven load factor, and, third, business and 
leisure traveler migration from conventional-cost airlines to low-cost 
airlines.  Our financial analysis substantiates this point to its fullest.  We find 
that markets value low-cost airline stocks as growth stocks, whereas 
conventional-cost airline stocks are treated as cyclical.5  Even though 
affected, low-cost carriers emerged from 9-11 in a stronger market position 
than their full-fare rivals.  Given the Canadian evidence provided by this 
study, as well as the results of earlier U.S. studies by Flouris and Walker 
(2005a, 2005b) and anecdotal evidence from various other countries, our 
findings can likely be extended to the global airline industry in that the low-
cost model outperforms the legacy model across our study parameters in the 
way it responds to catastrophic industry events. 
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a brief description of 
WestJet’s business model and compare it to the business model of Air 
Canada.  We highlight several key aspects of WestJet’s strategy, and make 
comparisons across carriers that are representative of the successful low-cost 
business model. The following sections provide a description of the data and 
explain the methodology used to test several hypotheses concerning the 
                                                 
5 Although we only report results for WestJet in this study, the accounting 
and stock price performance of other North American low-cost airlines such 
as Southwest, Air Tran and JetBlue in recent years was also remarkable 
relative to most other airlines in the region. 
30 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
 
accounting and stock performance of our sample airlines.  Results are 
presented. Findings are summarized in the final section. 
THE LOW-COST BUSINESS MODEL 
In this section we outline some of the common characteristics of the 
low-cost business model that WestJet and other LCCs such as easyJet, 
Ryanair, Southwest, JetBlue, and Air Tran have successfully employed in 
recent years.  Researchers such as Lennane (2000) have documented several 
advantages of the low-cost business model. Our goal in this study is to 
examine how and why low-cost carriers outperform legacy carriers in times 
of crisis.  While our empirical analysis focuses on WestJet, there is a large 
body of anecdotal evidence that suggests that other low-cost carriers—in 
several countries—have also fared significantly better after 9-11 than their 
full-service peers.6  There are many factors that set the low-cost business 
model apart from the full-service model.  Although it is impossible to 
determine to what degree each factor contributes to the continued out-
performance of low-cost carriers after catastrophic industry events, it is clear 
that the low-cost business model provides distinct advantages over the 
business model of full-service carriers in times of crisis.  We first summarize 
some of our empirical findings and then discuss the main differentiating 
factors between the two business models as they relate to our study. 
Our empirical analysis suggests that one of the primary factors that 
contributed to WestJet’s superior stock performance was its superior ability 
to cover both short-term and long-term liabilities. As we will discuss in more 
detail below, WestJet not only had a higher current ratio, that is, a healthier 
proportion of current assets relative to current liabilities, immediately prior 
to 9-11 but also a lower debt ratio.  Both factors likely put both bond and 
stock investors at ease as they could be somewhat confident that WestJet 
would not falter under the pressures that 9-11 put on the airline industry. In 
comparison, Air Canada had significantly fewer current assets on hand and 
was financially much more leveraged, which may have caused investors to 
shy away from it more quickly.  WestJet also benefited from considerably 
healthier profitability ratios prior to 9-11, as reflected in a higher return on 
assets and net profit margin.  Arguably, profitability is a good indicator of 
long-term liquidity. Thus, WestJet’s higher profitability likely reduced the 
perceived default risk for the firm even further.  Although WestJet already 
performed better pre-9-11 our results suggest that the performance gap 
widened even further afterwards. Naturally, the question arises about what 
may have caused WestJet’s out-performance of Air Canada. 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Lawton (2003). 
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According to a Unisys Global Transportation report, “. . . the only 
prerequisite to economic success is to achieve a low cost base from which to 
build a desired service offering” (Unisys, 2003).  This statement dismisses 
claims by full-service airlines that industry malaise is due to exogenous 
factors such as terrorist threats, rising oil prices, the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, or SARS and is valid vis-à-vis the Canadian airline industry experience.   
Since Air Canada acquired Canadian Airlines, the integration of the two 
companies did not produce the cost savings expected. Despite having over 
70% market share in Canada, the airline lost C$82 million in 2000, the year 
before 9-11 happened.  
Business models create a simplified description of the strategy of a 
profit-oriented enterprise. The low-cost airlines’ business model consists of a 
variety of characteristics, which includes price as its single most important 
product feature. In addition, most low-cost airlines are distinguishable from 
full-service carriers in terms of their product offering, corporate structure, 
workforce and work practices, and their operational procedures. 
We argue that most of these factors can also explain why WestJet and 
other low-cost airlines have done so well during the recent industry crisis 
when compared to full-service carriers.  The key qualitative factors that 
appear to set WestJet apart from legacy carriers such as Air Canada appear to 
be: (a) its focus on the core product (air transportation) without costly 
service offerings such as airport lounges, (b) the lower cost structure through 
the use of cheaper airports, online booking and a uniform fleet, (c) a lower 
and more flexible price structure, and (d) higher productivity through faster 
turnaround times and better use of its workforce.  
By boosting the profitability of WestJet and by having positive effects 
on other measures of accounting performance, irrespective of the industry 
climate, these factors translate into good performance even during difficult 
times for the airline industry. 
As our discussion points out, the full-service model employed by Air 
Canada, though reengineered after its emergence from bankruptcy protection 
in 2004, is still inherently inflexible (naturally) when confronted with sudden 
demand shocks and exposes the airlines to a significantly higher overhead 
burden that is difficult to cope with when unit sales, that is, bookings, drop. 
WestJet benefits from a lower overhead burden and more operational 
flexibility which allows it to weather difficult times better than its full-
service competitor.  
WestJet completed its initial public offering of 2.5 million common 
shares in July 1999 and transitioned to a public company.  The capital raised 
from the offering was used for the purchase of additional aircraft, as well as 
the building of a new head office and hangar facilities in Calgary.  In 
February of 2002, they offered an additional three million common shares 
yielding net proceeds of $78.9 million.  WestJet “celebrated its 27th quarter 
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of profitability with its third quarter 2003 results” (WestJet, 2007).  The 
following sections explore the performance differences quantitatively, both 
from an accounting standpoint and from the stock market’s perspective. 
DATA 
We use accounting data from January 2000 to December 2003.  We 
collected this data from year-end income statements and balance sheets, 
which are available online through Hoover’s Online database 
(www.hoovers.com). 
For our analysis of relative stock performances pre- and post-9-11, we 
use daily price data (adjusted for dividends and stock splits) from January 
1999 to April 2004, which we retrieved from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business 
(CRSP) database and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE).7  To measure 
market performance during our sample period, we use the TSE 300 market 
index.  Finally, we use weekly data on annualized 3-month Treasury Bill 
yields as calculated by the Bank of Canada as a proxy for the risk-free 
interest rate during our sample period. 
METHODOLOGY 
Financial markets bring together potential investors who vote every day 
on the future profitability of the firm and the relative merits of managers’ 
strategic decisions.  Simply put, if investors think that corporate decisions 
will lead to increases in long-run profitability, news of events such as a 
takeover will cause a firm’s stock price to rise.  Conversely, news that 
investors believe will lower future profits will result in a fall in a firm’s 
equity value. 
The finance literature refers to the idea that news is quickly impounded 
in security prices as the efficient market hypothesis, first described by Fama, 
Fisher, and Jensen (1969).  The assumption that markets are efficient implies 
that security prices reflect all relevant information known to investors and 
thus provide us with the best estimate of a firm’s future profitability.  There 
is significant empirical support for the efficient market hypothesis including 
the Carter and Simkins’ (2004) study of airline stocks following catastrophic 
events. We add to Carter and Simkins’ findings by focusing specifically on 
performance differences between low-cost and traditional-cost airlines. In 
addition, our study is the first to examine the accounting performance of 
                                                 
7 Note that our sample period is naturally truncated by the fact that Air 
Canada filed for bankruptcy protection on April 1, 2004. Thus, we restrict 
our analysis to the stock price and accounting performance prior to that date. 
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Canadian airlines post-9-11, and to examine how 9-11 influenced the 
systematic and unsystematic volatility of their returns. 
If we assume that markets are efficient, and therefore set rational prices, 
we can measure whether the corporate strategy of a low-cost carrier such as 
WestJet, post-9-11, was in the best interest of shareholders by comparing the 
firm’s profitability and stock price performance in the months after 9-11 to 
the performance of an airline that follows a conventional-cost business 
model (Air Canada). 
  
Financial ratio analysis 
To evaluate the accounting performance of our sample airlines we focus 
on examining some of the most frequently used financial ratios. Financial 
ratios can be grouped into four categories: (a) liquidity ratios, (b) activity 
ratios, (c) financing ratios, and (d) profitability ratios. Liquidity ratios 
provide measures of a company’s ability to satisfy short-term obligations. 
Activity ratios measure a company’s efficiency in managing its assets. 
Financing ratios provide some indication of the riskiness of a company with 
regard to paying its long-term debts. Finally, profitability ratios assist in 
evaluating various aspects of a company’s profit-making activities.  
It is important to remember that when using financial ratios to assess the 
overall financial stability of a company, more than one ratio should be 
considered when formulating an accurate opinion. For example, a company's 
solvency ratios may be ideal, but if the ratios that help analyze profitability 
and activity are bad (profits are down and sales are stagnant), a much 
different opinion would be formulated.  
Our comparison employs both a cross-sectional and a time-series 
analysis. Cross-sectional analysis consists of comparing the financial ratios 
of different firms in the same industry at the same point in time. Time-series 
analysis consists of comparing the firms’ accounting performance ratios over 
time. 
Tyran (1986), Lev (1994) and Gibson (1997) describe a plethora of 
financial ratios that fall under the aforementioned categories. For briefness, 
we only report those ratios here that we feel to be most insightful.8  The 
                                                 
8 Note also that many ratios that are frequently used for manufacturing firms 
are of little importance in the airline industry. For this reason, we do not 
discuss such ratios as inventory turnover, accounts receivable turnover or 
accounts payable turnover. For the same reason, we do not differentiate 
between a firm’s current ratio and acid test ratio. The acid test ratio is similar 
to the current ratio but eliminates the inventory figure in the current assets 
section of the balance sheet. Given that inventory is typically negligible for 
airlines this differentiation provides little additional insight. 
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Current Ratio. The current ratio measures the ability of the firm to pay its 
current bills while still allowing for a safety margin above the required 
amount needed to pay current obligations. We calculate the current ratio as 
Current Ratio = Current Assets / Current Liabilities. 
 
Activity ratios 
Total Asset Turnover. The total asset turnover is a measure of how 
efficiently and effectively a company uses its assets to generate sales. The 
higher the total asset turnover ratio, the more efficiently a firm’s assets have 
been used. We calculate the total asset turnover as Total Asset Turnover = 
Sales / Total Assets. 
 
Financing ratios 
Debt Ratio. This is a simple but effective ratio that indicates the firm's debt-
paying ability in the long run. The ratio represents the percentage of assets 
financed by creditors, and helps to determine how well the creditors are 
protected in case of insolvency. The higher the ratio, the greater the degree 
of outside financing by creditors. A high debt ratio indicates that the firm is 
more leveraged (has more debt) and is risky for creditors. We calculate the 
debt ratio as Debt Ratio = Total Liabilities / Total Assets. 
Interest Coverage Ratio. The interest coverage ratio (sometimes referred to 
as times interest earned) measures the ability of the firm to service all debts. 
The figure measures how many times interest payments could be made with 
a firm's earnings before interest expenses and taxes are paid. The higher the 
ratio, the more likely the firm can meet its obligations. We calculate the 
interest coverage ratio as Interest Coverage Ratio = Earnings Before Interest 
and Taxes (EBIT) / Interest. 
Profitability ratios 
Net Profit Margin. The net profit margin measures the amount of profits 
available to shareholders after interest and taxes have been deducted on the 
income statement. We calculate the net profit margin as Net Profit Margin = 
Net Income / Sales. 
Return on Assets (ROA). The return on assets measures the firm's ability to 
utilize its assets to create profits by comparing profits with the assets that 
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generate profits. We calculate the return on assets as ROA = Net Income / 
Total Assets. 
Return on Equity (ROE). The return on equity measures the return earned on 
the owners’ equity in the firm. The higher the rate the better the firm has 
increased wealth to shareholders. We calculate the return on equity as ROE 
= Net Income / Stockholders’ Equity. 
Stock performance analysis 
To examine the impact of 9-11 on the stock performance of our sample 
airlines, we follow the event study procedure described in Brown and 
Warner (1985), Peterson (1989), and Schweitzer (1989).  Event study 
methodology measures the abnormal return of the stock, as the difference 
between the actual return and the expected return, around the time of the 
event.  If an announcement such as news of increased profits is taken as 
good news, abnormal returns will be positive, signaling the market’s belief 
that firm value has increased.  A negative abnormal return is evidence of bad 
news, indicating that the market believes the event will decrease the firm’s 
future profitability. 
To estimate the abnormal return of a stock on day t, we subtract the 
expected return on the stock from its actual return on that day:  
 ARt = rt – E(rt)                                             (1) 
where ARt is the abnormal stock return, rt is the actual stock return, and E(rt) 
is the expected stock return, all on day t.  In turn, we assume that the return 
of a stock is conditional on the return of the market and model E(rt) as: 
 ])([)( ,,, tftmttft rrErrE −+= β                             (2) 
where E(rm,t) is the expected return of the market on day t, rf,t represents the 
risk-free rate as measured by the return on 90-day Canadian Treasury Bills 
on day t, and βt is the estimated slope coefficient from a linear regression of 
the stock’s past returns on the returns of the market.9 
                                                 
9 Equation 2 is also called the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and is 
based on Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).  In this paper, we estimate the 
capital asset pricing model using both 60 and 360 daily returns that precede 
our event window.  We employ a linear market model that illustrates the 
relationship between an airline’s stock return and the market (as proxied by 
the TSE 300 index) during a normal period. 
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We calculate daily abnormal returns for WestJet and Air Canada post-9-
11.10  In addition, we measure cumulative abnormal returns, CARt,t+n , the 
sum of abnormal returns over a window of n days, as: 






= ∑                                                  (3) 
Cumulative abnormal returns enable us to measure the market’s reaction 
to the performance of the airline in a time frame that encompasses the entire 
period from the event under study to the present. 
Earlier industry research has largely focused on airline stock returns 
following a plane crash.  Davidson, Chandy, and Cross (1987), Lin, 
Thiengtham, and Walker (2005), and Pukthuanthong, Thiengtham, and 
Walker (2007) find statistically significant negative returns for airlines on 
the day of the crash.  This appears to be a short-term effect, however, and is 
reversed on the days following the event.  Chance and Ferris (1987) examine 
46 plane crashes, and discover that in 29 cases the carrier has a significant 
negative return.  A crash does not appear to have an effect beyond the initial 
reaction, nor does it affect the stock price of the airline’s competitors.  
Chance and Ferris also find a negative correlation between the airline’s 
abnormal return and the number of fatalities in the crash.11 
More recently, Carter and Simkins (2004) investigated the stock 
market’s reaction to 9-11.  They note the potential psychological effects of 
the attack and test whether financial markets react rationally to news of the 
event.  Carter and Simkins find that despite the psychological horrors the 
market was able to discern among airlines based on firm characteristics, 
including the ability to cover short-term obligations.  Their results support 
rational pricing and have important implications for our work. 
To serve as a further control in estimating the market’s reaction to 9-11, 
our analysis compares the abnormal returns of WestJet’s stock to the 
abnormal returns of Air Canada.  We choose WestJet because it is uses a 
low-cost business model, and Air Canada because it uses a conventional-cost 
model and has done so quite successfully.  These firms should provide a 
good benchmark for examining industry reaction to the set of relevant 
                                                 
10 Because Canadian stock markets were closed following 9-11 and did not 
reopen until September 13, 2001, we define September 13, 2001, as the first 
day of our post-9-11 event window. 
11 Other studies that examine the consequences of airplane accidents for 
airlines include Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988), Mitchell and Maloney 
(1989), and Bosch, Eckard, and Singal (1998). 
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events.  We do not consider CanJet and JetsGo12 because they are not 
publicly traded and Air Trans since it derives a significant portion of its 
revenues from chartered flights. 
Adjusting for risk 
In considering risk changes, we calculate beta, the part of a firm’s risk 
that is related to changes in the market.  It is a measure of systematic risk, 
the risk that investors must be compensated for, and, thus, is related to a 
firm’s cost of capital.  If 9-11 led to the airline industry being a more risky 
business, we would expect airlines’ betas to increase after 9-11.  An airline’s 
beta, βi, can be found by regressing the airline’s daily stock returns against 
the daily stock returns on the market as in the following regression model: 
 imii err ++= βα                                                                     (4) 
where α  is the intercept, iβ  is the slope coefficient that represents the 
sensitivity of the stock’s returns to the returns on the market, mr , and ie  
represents the firm-specific residual, that is, the part of a firm’s return that 
cannot be captured by the regression model. An alternative method for 
calculating a firm’s beta coefficient employs the following formula: 
 2mmii /)r,rcov( σβ =                                                               (5) 
where )r,rcov( mi  is the covariance between firm i’s returns and the 
returns on the market, and 2mσ  is the variance of market returns. Both 
Equation 4 and Equation 5 will result in the same beta estimates and may be 
used interchangeably. We use beta coefficients to adjust the expected returns 
in our event study for risk as in Equation 2 and to distinguish between a 
firm’s systematic and unsystematic return volatility as discussed below. 
Cornell, Hirshleifer, and James (1997) review many of the practical 
issues in beta selection and the application of regression-based asset-pricing 
models to estimating equity cost of capital. They provide assistance for 
resolving many of the conventional problems with beta estimation, such as 
selection of the risk-free rate, the time period for estimation, and the 
inclusion or exclusion of dividends. 
Corgel and Djoganopoulos (2000) perform direct statistical comparisons 
of beta estimates calculated by large financial data vendors such as 
Bloomberg, Compustat, Dow Jones, and Ibbotson. They find that the 
                                                 
12 Both of these airlines have ceased operations since the first draft of this 
paper was written.  
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different procedures used by these commercial services produce the same 
results when simple tests of differences of means are used to evaluate them. 
They observe that most data vendors use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of the returns of the firm against those of the market, where the 
security's return serves as the dependent variable, and the independent 
variable is a user-selected index. They point out, however, that users of 
financial software packages typically have some flexibility and can select the 
time period for estimation, the market index against which they want to 
measure returns, the data frequency (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.), and 
whether they want to include dividends or not. 
Because the finance literature is divided on the issue whether short-term 
or long-term estimates should be used in CAPM estimation, we use a rolling 
window of both 60 and 360 calendar day returns to calculate covariances and 
variances.  Most authors and financial data vendors use long-term betas 
calculated over periods of three and more years, but given the rapidly 
changing environment for the airline industry, we found short-term estimates 
to be more appropriate. 
Expected market returns: Historical versus prospective estimates 
Before we can address the question of how we estimate expected market 
returns, we have to define the market.  In his famous critique of CAPM 
testing, Richard Roll (1977) indicates that the market portfolio to be used in 
CAPM estimation should contain all financial and non-financial assets 
available to investors and states that an accurate test of the CAPM will never 
be possible because of this requirement. 
Despite Roll’s criticism, most authors and financial data services use 
only country-specific common stocks to proxy for the market portfolio and 
rely heavily on the TSE 300 to represent the Canadian market. We follow 
this approach and use the TSE 300 market index for calculating both our 
beta estimates and market returns. 
When developing an estimate of the expected market return [E(rm)], one 
has to decide whether to use historical data, assuming that past performance 
is the best predictor of future performance, or make an attempt to forecast a 
return for the market, which would require an accurate estimate of future 
dividend growth. As with most other studies in this field, we do not consider 
ourselves wise enough to forecast future market returns, but rather rely on 
past returns as an estimate of future returns. Another question we had to 
address in our estimation was which time period to use to calculate past 
market returns. Given the fact that 9-11 occurred relatively recently and that 
our return data are thus limited, we decided to use the geometric average of 
market returns during the past 360 calendar days as an estimate of future 
market returns. To test the robustness of our results, we also calculated 60-
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calendar-day returns, but arrived at the same conclusions as we did with our 
long-term estimates. 
 
Systematic versus unsystematic volatility 
The systematic risk of a security is that part of the total risk that is 
associated with the movements in the underlying market. The unsystematic 
risk of a company’s stock is that part of total risk which is specific to that 
company. To examine the effect of 9-11 on both the systematic and 
unsystematic volatility of our sample firms, we partition the variance of a 
firm’s stock returns ( 2iσ ) into its two components, systematic variance 
( 22 mi σβ ) and unsystematic variance ( 2ieσ ), based on the formula: 
 2222
iemii
σσβσ +=                        (6) 
where iβ  and 2mσ  are as defined above and 2ieσ  represents the variance of 
the error terms, ie , in our regression model in Equation 4. 
An important statistic that emerges from the regression is the coefficient 
of determination R squared (R2). While the statistical explanation of the R2 is 
that it provides a measure of the goodness of fit of the regression, the 
economic rationale is that it provides an estimate of the proportion of the risk 
of a firm that can be attributed to market risk. The balance (1-R2) can then be 
attributed to firm-specific risk. 
There are two additional alternatives for calculating the R2 which we 







σβ=                                                                             (7) 
As we can observe, in this case the R2 is simply calculated by dividing 
the systematic risk of a firm’s returns by the total risk as calculated in 
Equation 6. The other alternative employs the correlation coefficient mi ,ρ  








, =                                                                 (8) 
where iσ  and mσ  represent the standard deviation of the returns for firm i 
and the market, respectively. 
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If we square the correlation coefficient mi ,ρ  we can observe that the 
term 2,miρ  is equivalent to the R2. Again, all three approaches may be used 
interchangeably and yield the same results.  As noted above, the R2 and (1-
R2) simply provide a proportional decomposition of a firm’s total variance 
2
iσ  into its two risk components, 22 mi σβ  and 2ieσ , and may be interpreted 
as percentage weights. 
RESULTS 
Accounting performance 
The first part of our analysis focuses on the relative performance of 
WestJet and Air Canada from an accounting standpoint, by comparing 
various accounting measures and financial ratios for the two firms over time. 
An analysis of the stock performance and return volatility of the two airlines 
follows in the next section. 
The accounting figures and financial ratios in the following table are 
based on year-end income statements and balance sheets from January 2000 
to December 2003 that we retrieved from Hoover’s Online database. As we 
can see, despite 9-11, WestJet managed to remain profitable on slightly 
declining sales, while Air Canada registered significant losses on falling 
revenues. 
WestJet’s current ratio is consistently above that of Air Canada and—
despite a slight decline in 2001 and 2003—improves significantly in 2003.  
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Table 1. Selected Accounting Data and Financial Ratios for WestJet and Air Canada 
Airlines, 2000-2003 
 
Time Period 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Panel A: 
WestJet     
Total Revenue 
(C$ Million) 332.5 478.4 680.0 859.6 
Net Income (C$ 
Million) 30.3 37.2 51.8 60.5 
Current Ratio 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.2 
Total Asset 
Turnover 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.6 
Interest 
Coverage Ratio 18.9 12.5 12.8 4.9 
Debt Ratio 46.3% 43.6% 54.6% 60.7% 
Net Profit 
Margin 9.1% 7.8% 7.6% 7.0% 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 9.0% 9.4% 6.6% 4.1% 
Return on 
Equity (ROE) 16.7% 16.7% 14.6% 10.4% 
Panel B: Air 
Canada     
Total Revenue 
(C$ Million) 9295.5 9,607.0 9,826.0 8,368.0 
Net Income (C$ 
Million) (112.5) (1,253.8) (828.0) (1,867.0) 
Current Ratio 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Total Asset 
Turnover 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 
Interest 
Coverage Ratio 0.0 -2.6 -1.0 -6.8 * 
Debt Ratio 102.2% 110.6% 130.9% 160.1% 
Net Profit 
Margin -1.2% -13.1% -8.4% -22.3% 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) -1.2% -14.1% -11.2% -27.0% 
Return on 
Equity (ROE) n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. 
Note. n.m. = not meaningful 
 
* As a result of its April 1, 2003, bankruptcy filing, Air Canada ceased to accrue interest on 
unsecured debt that is subject to compromise. While under creditor protection, Air Canada only 
reported interest expenses to the extent that they will be paid under the plan of arrangement or 
that it is probable that it will be an allowed claim. Approximately C$179 million of interest 
expense on unsecured debt would have been recorded in addition to the C$85 million on its 
income statement had the filings not occurred. We use the sum of these two numbers, that is, 
C$264 million, to calculate the interest coverage ratio in 2003. 
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A comparison of the activity ratios shows that WestJet’s asset turnover 
ratio weakens after the catastrophic industry events. This is not the case for 
Air Canada. A look at the financing ratios, however, points a very different 
picture for our sample airlines. Although WestJet’s interest coverage ratio 
drops significantly during our sample period (from 18.9 in 2000 to 4.9 in 
2003), the firm remains in a good position to cover its interest expenses.  On 
the other hand, the impact of 9-11 on the interest coverage ratio of Air 
Canada is tremendous: the airline had interest coverage ratios below 1 
throughout our sample period, indicating that they experienced significant 
difficulties in making their interest payments. This ultimately resulted in Air 
Canada’s bankruptcy filing on April 1, 2003. 
Even before 9-11, Air Canada had a significantly higher debt ratio than 
WestJet. In fact, throughout our sample period, Air Canada’s debt ratio 
exceeds 100%, fueled by a deficit in its shareholder equity. The high 
leverage and the accompanying financial risk are likely to be one of the 
reasons for the quick deterioration of Air Canada’s financial ratios. By 2003, 
the debt ratio of WestJet rose to 60.7% (from 46.3% in 2000). In 
comparison, Air Canada’s shareholder’s equity deficit grew so large that in 
2003 its debt ratio exceeded 160%. 
The profitability ratios (ROA, ROE and profit margin) of WestJet are 
comparatively healthy after 9-11, although they remain below the 
profitability levels that WestJet showed in 2000. In contrast, Air Canada 
shows very strong signs of weakening post-9-11.13 
Overall, our financial ratio analysis paints a grim picture for Air Canada 
while we observe only a slight deterioration in the accounting performance 
for WestJet. In its 2002 annual report, Air Canada emphasizes cost-cutting as 
one of the primary goals for the near future.  Because cost cutting measures 
and other managerial actions generally take some time to be reflected on a 
firm’s financial statements, it is difficult to determine their success through a 
short-term financial ratio analysis. If investors perceive such actions to be 
effective, however, they will be reflected in the financial performance of the 
firm’s stock. Since financial theory suggests that the price of a stock should 
be equal to the present value of all future dividends, a stock performance 
analysis generally provides a good insight into how the financial markets 
expect a firm to do in the future. 
For firms entering bankruptcy protection, a stock price analysis also 
provides a reasonable estimate of the market’s expectation about the future 
of the firm, that is, whether or not it can successfully emerge from the 
bankruptcy. Air Canada filed for bankruptcy protection on April 1, 2003. 
                                                 
13 Note that we do not report the return on equity (ROE) for Air Canada in 
Table 1. Given that Air Canada carries a deficit in shareholder equity on its 
balance sheet throughout our sample period, this ratio is not meaningful. 
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Thus stock prices after this date reflect investors’ consensus estimate of a 
successful emergence from bankruptcy. Although the firm successfully 
renegotiated labor contracts and locked in new financing arrangements 
(including a new C$850 million financing arrangement with Deutsche Bank 
and a C$250 equity million infusion by Cerberus Capital Management), any 
hopes of a stock price recovery were tainted when Air Canada received court 
approval to have its stocks cancelled. The company emerged from 
bankruptcy protection on September 30, 2004, and ACE Holdings, the new 
parent firm of the airline, quickly gained investor interest, with its Class B 
shares trading at C$35.75 at the end of December 2004—a premium of C$15 
above their offering price. Since then, the shares have traded largely 
sideways, closing at a price of C$33.98 on January 31, 2007. 
 
Stock performance and return volatility 
In order to examine how the financial markets reacted to 9-11 and 
whether investors put more confidence into low-cost carriers such as WestJet 
than into airlines that follow a conventional-cost model such as Air Canada, 
we examine the stock price performance of the two airlines pre- and post-9-
11. Table 2 presents quarterly and yearly returns for the airlines and the 
market as proxied by the TSE 300 index. 
The data clearly show the impact of 9-11 on the airline industry and the 
market. We observe a highly negative return for the airlines and the market 
index during the third quarter of 2001, followed by several quarters of high 
volatility when compared to the pre-9-11 period. Air Canada’s stock price 
declined by more than 58.3% in the third quarter of 2001, while WestJet’s 
stock dropped to a much lesser extent (31.5%). 
Since the returns in Table 2 are not adjusted for risk, we are not yet in a 
position to draw any conclusions about the significance of these performance 
differences. Before we can evaluate the impact of 9-11 on the risk-adjusted 
stock price performance of our sample airlines, we first examine how 9-11 
impacted the airlines’ beta coefficients and the systematic and unsystematic 
volatility of their returns. 
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Table 2. Quarterly and Yearly Return Data for WestJet and Air Canada Airlines,             
1999-2004 
Quarter WestJet Air Canada Market Index 
1999-Q1 N/A 8.94% 1.73% 
1999-Q2 N/A -7.46% 6.25% 
1999-Q3 21.61% * 61.29% -0.75% 
1999-Q4 22.70% 9.00% 20.93% 
1999 Total 22.16% 15.38% 6.72% 
2000-Q1 18.02% 42.20% 12.46% 
2000-Q2 53.37% 25.81% 7.75% 
2000-Q3 4.44% -22.56% 1.79% 
2000-Q4 -1.06% -9.27% -13.92% 
2000 Total 16.95% 5.88% 1.51% 
2001-Q1 -20.43% -42.34% -14.84% 
2001-Q2 31.62% 10.51% 1.69% 
2001-Q3 -31.50% -58.30% -11.60% 
2001-Q4 42.51% 37.91% 12.43% 
2001 Total 0.55% -22.20% -3.68% 
2002-Q1 25.16% 37.65% 2.12% 
2002-Q2 -30.25% 2.03% -8.99% 
2002-Q3 -12.29% -31.91% -13.51% 
2002-Q4 -11.26% -1.04% 7.02% 
2002 Total -9.21% -1.37% -3.69% 
2003-Q1 -2.79% -55.79% -4.10% 
2003-Q2 1.78% -36.19% 10.09% 
2003-Q3 52.07% -15.67% 6.27% 
2003-Q4 17.08% 17.70% 10.78% 
2003 Total 15.21% -27.26% 5.59% 
2004-Q1 -7.73% -0.75% 4.44% 
* Note that WestJet went public on July 13, 1999. Thus, our return calculations for the third 
quarter of 1999 are based on WestJet’s price data after that date, excluding its initial public 
offering (IPO) under pricing return of 25%. 
 
Risk analysis 
To measure differences in risk levels between the airlines and examine 
how those risk levels changed after 9-11, we first calculate beta coefficients 
for the airlines pre-9-11 and post-9-11 following the regression model in 
Equation 2. The resulting beta estimates are presented in Table 3. 
Undoubtedly, 9-11 had a significant impact on both the economy as a 
whole and the airline industry in particular. By differentiating between 
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systematic and unsystematic risk in Table 3 we can examine the impact of 9-
11 on return volatility in more detail.14 
Although Roll (1986) discusses the possibility that unsystematic 
volatility may be noise, or in his words “frenzy unrelated to concrete 
information” (p. 204), recent empirical evidence by Morck, Yeung and Yu 
(2000) and Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) provides support for the notion 
that firm-specific return variation gauges the extent to which information 
about a firm is quickly and accurately reflected in stock prices. 
Table 3. Stock Return Volatility Pre- and Post-9-11 for WestJet and Air Canada Airlines, 
Estimated Over Periods of 60 and 360 Days 
 WestJet Air Canada WestJet Air Canada 
 60 Calendar Days Pre-9-11 360 Calendar Days Pre-9-11 
Beta )( iβ  0.118 0.251 0.093 0.503 
Total risk )( 2iσ  6.76 6.25 6.71 10.45 
Systematic risk )( 22 mi σβ  0.01 0.04 0.02 0.58 
Unsystematic risk )( 2
ie
σ  6.75 6.21 6.69 9.87 
Proportion of systematic risk 
)( 22, Rmi =ρ  0.0013 0.0061 0.0029 0.0550 
Proportion of unsystematic 
risk )1( 2R−  0.9987 0.9939 0.9971 0.9450 
 60 Calendar Days Post-9-11 360 Calendar Days Post-9-11 
Beta )( iβ  1.106 2.169 0.790 1.467 
Total risk )( 2iσ  19.72 102.05 9.99 36.86 
Systematic risk )( 22 mi σβ  1.74 6.70 0.62 2.15 
Unsystematic risk )( 2
ie
σ  17.98 95.35 9.36 34.71 
Proportion of systematic risk 
)( 22, Rmi =ρ  0.0883 0.0657 0.0625 0.0584 
Proportion of unsystematic 
risk )1( 2R−  0.9117 0.9343 0.9375 0.9416 
 
                                                 
14 Note that a recent study by Hilliard and Savickas (2002) proposes an 
alternative method for examining the impact of an event on a firm’s 
unsystematic volatility. Preliminary tests on our sample suggested no 
significant quantitative or qualitative differences in the results under either 
method. For briefness, we limit our discussion to the method presented here. 
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Not surprisingly, we find that the beta coefficients of both airlines 
increased considerably after 9-11. During the 360 calendar days prior to 9-
11, WestJet had a beta of 0.093, compared to a beta of 0.503 for Air Canada. 
When performing the same analysis for the 360–day period after 9-11, we 
observe that WestJet’s beta increased to 0.79, while Air Canada had a post-
9-11 beta of 1.47. The differences are even more extreme when decomposing 
the airlines’ total return variation as in Equation 6. Here, we observe a 
significant increase in the total risk for each airline, especially for Air 
Canada. In addition, we observe that systematic risk accounts for a 
significantly larger proportion of total return variation in the post-9-11 
period. For WestJet, the increase is particularly large, as the coefficient of 
determination, R2, rises more than twenty-fold (from 0.0029 during the 360 
days prior to 9-11 to 0.0625 during the same period afterwards). For Air 
Canada, the increase in the systematic risk component is approximately 
6.1%. 
Overall, we observe that the return variability for Air Canada appears to 
be primarily driven by firm-specific, that is, unsystematic, risk factors. The 
returns for WestJet, on the other hand, appear to be more and more driven by 
market wide risk factors. 
There are two conclusions that can be drawn from our volatility 
analysis. First, the betas of both sample airlines have increased significantly, 
and are particularly high for Air Canada. With a beta of 0.093 prior to 9-11, 
WestJet showed little dependency on the overall market. Even though its 
beta remains below 1, it is now much more affected by return fluctuations in 
the market. If the betas remain at these elevated levels and the CAPM holds, 
then we can expect both airlines to be significantly more sensitive to the 
overall market than prior to 9-11. 
Second, although the total risk of each airline has increased significantly 
after 9-11, the proportion of systematic risk increased for both airlines, 
particularly for WestJet. This suggests that market volatility has a much 
bigger influence on the return of each airline and bodes well for poorly 
diversified investors or sector-specific funds as—according to the CAPM—
they should get rewarded for a larger proportion of the total risk they bear. 
 
Risk-adjusted stock performance 
To calculate how the returns compare between the airlines after 
adjusting for risk, we employ event study methodology and calculate the 
risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for each airline pre- and post-9-11 
in a CAPM framework. We use 90-day treasury bill rates as a proxy for the 
risk-free rate and historical market returns based on 60 and 360 calendar 
days to forecast expected market returns. Table 4 presents non-risk-adjusted 
returns of the airlines for various time periods after 9-11. 
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We observe that both airlines were negatively impacted by 9-11, with 
Air Canada performing the worst, losing over 23% on the first trading day 
following 9-11 and over 78% during the following 30 months. In 
comparison, WestJet lost only 12% on the first trading day after 9-11 and 
actually gained 58% within 30 months after the event. Both airlines show a 
medium-term recovery three to six months after 9-11, followed by a repeated 
downturn after 18 months, from which Air Canada was never able to 
recover. 
Table 4. Non-Risk-Adjusted Returns Following 9-11, for WestJet and Air Canada Airlines 
Non-Risk-Adjusted Returns Following September 11, 2001 
Time Elapsed Since 9-11 WestJet Air Canada Market 
1 Day * -12.3% -23.1% -3.3% 
1 Week -22.9% -33.6% -5.9% 
2 Weeks -14.9% -45.3% -11.3% 
1 Month -2.9% -64.1% -3.9% 
2 Months 12.5% -41.9% -1.6% 
3 Months 24.7% -22.2% 2.5% 
6 Months 62.9% 2.5% 7.7% 
1 Year 4.7% -13.3% -9.9% 
18 Months -8.6% -55.6% -14.3% 
2 Years 41.9% -78.9% 3.5% 
30 Months 58.3% -78.3% 19.1% 
* Note that the Canadian markets were closed for two business days following September 11, 
2001. Thus, we calculate 1-day performance as the return from the close of trading on 
September 10 to the close of trading on September 13, 2001. 
 
Table 5 presents risk-adjusted returns following 9-11 using 60-day 
trailing betas and market risk premiums estimated using 60-day historical 
returns. Although negative in the short run, we find that the risk-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for WestJet are positive in the medium 
and long run (1 to 30 months after 9-11). Although Air Canada shows some 
positive CARs in the medium term (3 months to 1 year after 9-11), they 
become negative in the long run. 




Table 5. Risk-Adjusted Returns Following 9-11 Using Short-Term Estimates, for WestJet 
and Air Canada Airlines 
Risk-Adjusted Returns Following September 11, 2001 
(Using 60-Day Trailing Betas and Market Risk Premiums Estimated Using 60-Day 
Historical Returns) 
Time Elapsed Since September 11, 2001 WestJet Air Canada 
1 Week -24.48% -34.86% 
2 Weeks -4.79% -59.47% 
1 Month 2.84% -86.37% 
2 Months 22.08% -23.89% 
3 Months 34.46% 13.77% 
6 Months 73.60% 16.46% 
1 Year 40.56% 20.84% 
18 Months 35.27% -17.43% 
2 Years 73.99% -58.80% 
30 Months 64.40% -65.00% 
 
Table 6 presents a long-term approach for estimating the inputs in our 
CAPM model. Here, we calculate risk-adjusted returns by using 360-day 
trailing betas and market risk premiums based on 360-day historical returns. 
Table 6. Risk-Adjusted Returns Following 9-11 Using Long-Term Estimates, for WestJet 
and Air Canada Airlines 
Risk-Adjusted Returns Following September 11, 2001 
(Using 360-Day Trailing Betas and Market Risk Premiums Estimated Using 360-Day 
Historical Returns) 
Time Elapsed Since September 11, 2001 WestJet Air Canada 
1 Week -24.71% -35.41% 
2 Weeks -5.58% -61.91% 
1 Month 1.04% -89.91% 
2 Months 17.42% -29.56% 
3 Months 28.97% 6.47% 
6 Months 63.32% 35.27% 
1 Year 27.24% 3.41% 
18 Months 23.34% -4.63% 
2 Years 75.24% -20.20% 
30 Months 67.06% -52.38% 
 
 Flouris & Walker 49 
 
 
The results are similar to those presented in Table 5: WestJet clearly 
outperforms Air Canada on a risk-adjusted basis after 9-11. It is noteworthy, 
however, that Air Canada’s underperformance is somewhat tamed when we 
use long-term estimates in our calculations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Notwithstanding the fact that WestJet has been an innovative operation 
and, as the numbers and our analysis shows, has been quite successful even 
during difficult times, will it be able to maintain its success in the future?  
Will customers continue to remain loyal? Will the firm prevail in case 
investor confidence if the aviation industry deteriorates even further?  Will 
the firm prevail if serious safety concerns arise about its operation or the 
operation of low-cost carriers in general? 
Besides WestJet in Canada, other low-cost airlines such as Virgin Blue 
in Australia, AirAsia in Malaysia and Thailand, RyanAir and easyJet in 
Europe, and JetBlue and Southwest in the U.S. have been similarly 
successful. In Canada, we may see the emergence of additional low-cost 
airlines.  Also, legacy carriers such as Air Canada have worked very hard to 
reinvent themselves as low-cost airlines.  Especially in North America, 
currently, the service offering of LCCs and legacy airlines is virtually 
identical in regard to their domestic service, with legacy airlines still offering 
an international and in some cases global network as a significant point of 
differentiation with LCCs that typically have limited or no international 
networks. 
We explain WestJet’s overall success from an operational standpoint. 
WestJet has a lower and more variable cost structure and a lower breakeven 
load factor, which allows it to react to a changing environment more quickly 
than conventional airlines. In addition, WestJet benefits from the migration 
of leisure and even business travelers from conventional-cost airlines to low-
cost airlines.  Our financial analysis substantiates these qualitative 
observations.  Financial markets appear to have more confidence in the 
flexibility and continued growth potential of WestJet than its traditional-cost 
counterpart Air Canada (which is treated as cyclical).  Even though affected, 
WestJet and similar low-cost carriers in the U.S. emerged from such crises as 
9-11, the 2002 SARS outbreak, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, rising jet 
fuel prices, and temporary demand declines caused by heightened fear of 
additional terrorist attacks in a stronger market position than their 
conventional-cost rivals (see also Flouris & Walker, 2005a, 2005b).  From a 
management standpoint, we believe that adopting a viable strategic position, 
leveraging organizational capabilities, and reconceiving the value equation 
are critical in defining the comparative advantage of low-cost carriers. 
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